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Mental states made the task of explaining the nature of the mind really difficult. The 
claim that they are ontologically separable from the brain states, which consists of 
neural entities, properties, interactions and processes in some particular regions of the 
brain, strengthens the dualist position that the physicalist denies. This paper examines 
the plausibility of neurofunctionalism and neuroessentialism as physicalist 
explanatory hypotheses to bridge the explanatory gap between mental states and brain 
states. If these hypotheses are sufficiently advanced, physicalism is further 
strengthened and threatens dualism. To achieve this, the first part of the paper restates 
the explanatory gap argument. The second develops neurofuctionalism and 
neuroessentialism as physicalist explanatory hypotheses. On the account of these 
hypotheses, the third part argues that the gap between mental state and brain state 
could be bridged. The conclusion reaffirms the plausibility of the physicalist 
hypotheses. 
Key Words: Functionalism, Neurofunctionalism, Essentialism, Neuroessentialism, 
Explanatory Gap Argument. 
 
Introduction 
Questions about the mind, its nature, its properties and how it works are being 
addressed in disciplines other than philosophy. Sleuthing about such questions had led 
to complex debates in psychology, brain science or neuroscience, artificial 
intelligence, cognitive sciences, to mention a few. The fact that no single discipline 
can do full justice to the complexity of issues and questions about mind explains its 
interdisciplinary appeal. In philosophy, the essence of mind is thinking or 
consciousness, and parts of its characteristics are that it is free, indestructible, 
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indivisible and it is known directly (Searle, 2004, 16). Apart from this, the contents of 
the mind, which include mental states, possess phenomenal or qualitative property. 
For instance, for a particular kind of mental state (pain), there is the ‘what it is like to 
be in that kind of mental state (pain)’. The ‘what it is like to be’ is variously referred 
to as ‘subjective character of conscious experience’, (Nagel, 2007, 519) ‘qualia’, ‘raw 
feels’, ‘phenomenal consciousness’, ‘phenomenal me-ness or mine-ness’ or 
phenomenology feature of experience (Howell and Thompson, 2016). The dualists 
affirm that there is a gap between this property of mental state and brain properties; 
the physicalists deny the gap arguing that the brain and its properties are all there is to 
the mind and its properties. Some attempts to address the problem about the nature of 
a mental state and a brain state merely widened the dualist’s gap, without touching on 
the real problem (Taylor, 2016), especially because, as Ataria argues, “as long as 
subjective experience remains at least somewhat inaccessible, we will not be able to 
bridge this gap” (2017, 7).  
In the present paper, I examine the plausibility of two new physicalist 
explanatory hypotheses – neurofunctionalism and neuroessentialism – on the nature of 
mental states and brain states. If the hypotheses are proven, the physicalist’s denial of 
the gap between mental states and brain states is strengthened, thus weakening 
dualism. Otherwise, the gap is left wider than before. The paper is in three parts. The 
first briefly restates the dualist’s explanatory gap argument. The second outlines the 
two physicalist explanatory hypotheses on the nature of mental states and brain states. 
The third examines the potentiality of closing the dualist’s gap through the new 
hypotheses. The paper establishes that given the functionalist understanding of the 
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findings of the neuroscientists on the nature of mental states and brain states, the 
proposed hypotheses provides a physicalist explanation of the two states without 
leaving any gap. 
 
The Explanatory Gap Argument 
The explanatory gap between the phenomenal (mental) state and the brain 
state is premised on the distinction between the feel (say what it feels like to drink 
coffee or perceive the aroma of coffee) that I have when drinking or perceiving the 
aroma of coffee and certain neural activation (say c-fiber activation) going on in my 
brain when I am drinking coffee or perceiving the aroma of coffee (Levine, 2002, 
354-361). The question is “how can this experience, this subjective feeling (of 
drinking or perceiving the aroma coffee), be exactly the same thing as the activation 
of my c-fibers?” (Kammere, 2019, 650).  
The point of the explanatory gap is that there is a clear distinction between 
phenomenal states (the subjective conscious experience of a mental state) and brain 
states of any kind: neural activation, neural firing, neural processes, etc. This 
distinction, which David Papineau called strong distinctness about phenomenal and 
brain states (2002), premised dualist’ disagreement with any proposed monist (for 
instance, a physicalist) solution to the mind–body problem. Put in simple terms, the 
explanatory gap argument is that any objective causal explanation of a mental state, 
such as a real pain, as opposed to phantom, delusion or illusion of pain, be it in 
biology, neuroscience, or psychology, will fail as a complete account of pain. This is 
because there is a property of pain, the phenomenal consciousness or conscious 
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experience or quale of pain, which the physicalist explanation of pain excludes, and 
this exclusion creates a gap in explanation of pain.  
Several attempts have been, and are still being, made by the physicalists to 
either deny dualism or affirm the superiority of physicalism, and even both, regarding 
the nature of mental and brain states. One of the physicalist strategies is to explain the 
nature of mental states in such a way that makes it clear that their existence is 
compatible with physicalism (Stoljar, 2010). Hence, contrary to the claim in the 
explanatory gap argument that mental states are different from brain (physical) states, 
the physicalists argue that there are ways of explaining away the supposed difference. 
For instance, the behaviourist asserts that to have a particular phenomenal state is to 
exhibit a certain characteristic pattern of behaviour (Ryle, 1949). “One of the most 
obvious objections to the theory is that it seems perfectly possible for an individual to 
have some particular mental state without exhibiting any of the behaviour or having 
any of the behavioural dispositions that typically accompany that mental state” 
(Francescotti, 2014, 1).  
The argument from multiple realisability, that is, the idea that a mental state 
can be realised in more than one single brain state, has been used to prove the 
inadequacy of the identity theories, which in general affirm that a mental state of any 
kind is synonymous to having an inner state in the brain that plays a certain causal 
role, hence the mental state is nothing but a brain state (Ryle, 1949). The idea that 
mental properties are multiply realisable has been thought by many to show that the 
identity theory is false. If mentality is multiply realisable at the neural level, then 
instances of the same mental property can be instances of different neural properties 
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(Francescotti, 2014).  Moreover, Fodor (1971) and Putnam (1960) are quite 
pessimistic that the identity between a quale or a feel of pain, and a token of neural 
processes, say c-fibers firing, could justifiably be established. As an alternative, they 
have suggested that what is important is to establish what a c-fiber firing would do 
rather than what it is. The important questions are: What does the firing of the c-fibers 
contribute to the operation of an organism where it takes place? Could the c-fibers 
firing be linked with the feel of pain? These questions introduce the core idea of 
functionalism, which is that mental states and properties (beliefs, desires, being in 
pain, etc.) are functions of some physical phenomena, properties, processes, etc.  
Functionalism is the thesis that what characterizes something like a thought, a 
desire, a pain, etc., as a mental state, does not depend on its internal constitution, but 
on the way it functions, or the role it plays, in the system in which it is a part. There 
are several types of functionalism: machine functionalism, analytic functionalism, and 
lately, homuncular functionalism. The next section of the paper accounts for and 
adopts the provisions of homuncular functionalism in order to develop two 
hypotheses as possible physicalist responses to the dualist’s explanatory gap 
argument. 
Neurofunctionalism and Neuroessentialism as Physicalist Hypotheses 
Homuncular functionalism, largely developed by Dennett (1981) and 
advocated by Lycan (1990), is a form of functionalist’s response to the explanatory 
gap argument. In formulating homuncular functionalism, a human being is compared 
to a large corporation, made up of cooperating departments, each with its own 
function. These departments interpret stimuli and produce behavioural responses. 
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Each department is, in turn, constituted by further units, and each unit can also be 
broken down to its constituent elements. Appropriating this understanding to human 
beings, a human being is taken as a corporation made up of departments, units and 
constituent elements; this break down continues up to the neurological levels.   
Homuncular functionalism is the thesis that mental states and all its properties 
are just the functions of a number of sub-systems or units, envisaged as homunculi, 
performing simple tasks in co-ordination with each other. Homunculi are some sort of 
small, diminutive human or a miniature, but fully formed individuals, which are 
believed by some adherents of the early biological theory of preformation to be 
present in the sperm cells (Dennett, 1975 and Lycan, 1990). What is taken from this 
view is that mental states are the functions of some agents – some homunculi – in the 
human body.  
At the centre of Dennett’s homuncular functionalism is the view that a 
homunculus is an intelligent and rational subsystem, which makes up and functions 
for the general well-being of an intentional system. It possesses certain goals and 
aspirations (or desires) and certain information (which represents beliefs) peculiar to 
it. As Dennett argues, irrespective of their physical constitution, based solely on the 
knowledge and assumptions about the homunculi’s desires, purposes and beliefs, it is 
possible to make predictions about what homunculi could do or could not do 
(Dennett, 1981, 3-5). Taking a clue from Dennett’s homuncular functionalism, in 
addressing the gap between mental and brain states, we can hypothesize as follows:  
1. A human being is an intentional system, and this system consists of several 
homunculi (intelligent and rational subsystems); 
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2. The body (and its properties) and mind (and its properties) are homunculi 
(intelligent and rational subsystem) in the intentional system; and 
3. The mind as a homunculus (an intelligent and rational subsystem) in an 
intentional system (a human being), exists and operates within the contexts of 
some other homunculi, such as body (and its properties), which make up the 
intentional system – the human being.  
In view of 1-3, the following grounds could be granted: 
a. that a homunculus functions in conjunction with other homunculi in an 
intentional system,  
b. that each homunculus possesses certain goals, aspirations, and information, 
which are peculiar to it, and 
c. that a homunculus functions, within the context of other homunculi, for the 
general well-being of an intentional system.  
From a-c above, we could hypothesize as follows: 
Given that in functionalism, “mental states are defined as states (in the mind) 
that have certain sorts of functions, and the notion of function is explained in terms of 
causal relations to external stimuli, to other mental states, and to external behaviour” 
(Searle, 2004, 62), then a mental state could be taken as a homunculus in the mind, 
which has peculiar functions (aspirations, desires, beliefs, etc.) within the context of 
the mind and every other states (homunculi) that make up the intentional (human) 
system.  As asserted in 2, the body and its properties (for example, the central nervous 
system), as homunculi also consists of other homunculi such as the neural entities, 
limbic system, amygdala, chemicals, and properties. For the purpose of argument, we 
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could identify these other homunculi in the central nervous system as 
‘neurohomunculi’.  Thus, to repeat Searle, if “mental states are defined as states (in 
the mind) that have certain sorts of functions, and the notion of function is explained 
in terms of causal relations to external stimuli, to other mental states, and to external 
behaviour” (Searle, 2004, 62), then it could be deduced that a mental state and its 
phenomenal properties are seen in terms of their functions. Thus, a mental state is a 
particular homunculus, which is explained in terms of causal relations it has with 
other homunculi in an intentional system. Hence, a mental state is explainable within 
the context of other homunculi, such as the central nervous system (neurohomunculi) 
in an intentional system. In explaining the mental state then, an account of the causal 
relations among the neurohomunculi (which comprise of all the states and properties 
in a human being) could suffice. In as much as neurohomunculi are available for 
empirical investigation, then a mental state could be given an empirical investigation 
resulting into its being explained empirically. This is the basis of the hypothesis called 
neurofunctionalism.  
Since a mental state is a function within the context of neurohomunculi 
(central nervous system), and neurohomunculi are essentially what are susceptible to 
empirical investigation, it could be inferred that neuroscientists can partially account 
for the principles or mechanisms that explain the existence of a mental state. 
Moreover, while other kinds of neuroscience such as neuroanatomy and 
neurophysiology could explore the various neurohomunculi in the body, 
neurofunctionalism is offered as another kind of neuroscience directed at accounting 
for what constitutes causal explanation of a particular mental experience. If 
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neuroscience can provide an understanding of the principles and mechanisms that 
explains the neurohomunculi and their functions, then neuroscience could plausibly 
account for mental states. This possibility is probably the basis of Badcock’s (2016) 
attempt at exploring the characteristic features of some sort of mental states such as 
AVH (auditory verbal hallucinations) and TI (thought insertion) in terms of 
disturbances in basic psychological and physiological mechanisms underpinning 
human behaviour. This Badcock’s attempt, if successful, boosts the credibility of 
neurofunctionalism.    
The neurofunctionalist hypothesis could be objected on a few grounds. For 
instance, it could be argued that so far, no account of mental states has been given as 
functions of neurohomunculi in the central nervous system. The neurofunctionalist 
response should be that there is, at present, no complete knowledge of all the 
neurohomunculi in the central nervous system. The fact that a particular mental state 
has not been traced as a function of some neurohomunculi, but only of the mind, 
which is also a homunculus, is not a conclusive evidence that mental states are not 
amenable to neuroscientific explanation of the kind proposed. Moreover, the point 
that there is no rigid or definitive role for a particular neuron (neurohomunculus) in 
the central nervous system may suggest a difficulty in the neurofunctionalist 
hypothesis. This calls for the identification of a specific function of a neurotransmitter 
or a receptor, or a specific interaction of both, as the explanation of a mental state. For 
example, dopamine is one of the principal neurotransmitters in the central nervous 
system, and with its interaction with the appropriate dopamine receptors, dopamine 
plays a crucial role in the production of different kinds of feelings (mental states) such 
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as motivation, reward, attention, learning, moods. The implication is that a proper 
understanding of this neurotransmitter could lead to an explanation of how it produces 
the different kinds of feelings (mental states) associated with it. Hence, the 
neurofunctionalist hypothesis raises further challenges to the neuroscientists to, 
through further researches and experiments, offer neurological accounts of the nature 
of the ‘neurohomunculi’ that function as mental states. This further task, if 
accomplished, would establish why a particular neurohomunculus, interacting with 
other neurohomunculi, would function in a particular way. This would also justify the 
neurofunctionalist assumption that a particular kind of function is expected from a 
particular kind of neurohomunculi, and formulate principles, formulas, laws, theories, 
etc, that establish the claim that mental states are functions of the neurohomunculi in 
the central nervous system. The task of exploring the essences of neurohomunculi 
aligns with a new research focus in neuroanatomy, neurophysiology and 
neurofunctionalism called neuroessentialism whose idea was first mooted by Roskies 
(2007) and named and advanced by Reiner (2011). 
Neuroessentialism is a physicalist hypothesis being developed to account for 
the essence of neurons, and every other associated states, properties, processes and 
activities in the brain. It is necessitated by the need to account for the ontology and 
nature of the neurohomunculi. What is immediately obvious from the 
neuroanatomists, neurophysiologists and the others is that neurohomunculi exist as 
real entities in the world. However, the neuroscientists’ ontological claim that 
neurohomunculi exist is based on what the neurohomunculi do, rather than what they 
are or what they are made up of and what make them do what they do. For instance, 
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none of the neuroscience research and experiments reveal the real nature or the 
essence of the neurohomunculi. It appears that neuroscientists usually assume the 
essential nature of the neurohomunculi, and on the basis of this assumption infer the 
principles and mechanisms which underlie the functional character of the 
neurohomunculi. To justify this assumption, a correct understanding of the real nature 
or real essence of the neurohomunculi is necessary in current neurosciences. At 
present, the search for the real nature or the essences of neurohomunculi – the 
neurochemicals, neural properties, processes and activities – is, if any, at low ebb.  
One possible way of advancing research on the real nature of neurohomunculi 
is by looking for what Locke describes as real essences. The real essences of a thing 
are hidden constitutions of the thing; they are what make a thing what it is, and are 
responsible for the causal and functional characters of the thing (Locke, 1977, 283). 
Neuroessentialism aims to explore the real essences of the neurohomunculi. This 
would help to explain why and how specific functions identified as mental states are 
expected as functions of some specific neurohomunculi. This is the fulcrum of 
neuroessentialism. The neuroessentialists would show that mental states are expected 
functions of some neurohomunculi in the central nervous system. Since 
neurohomunculi are physical entities or properties in the human central nervous 
system, and mental states are identified as their functions, questions about the nature 
of mental states could be answerable within the purview of physical sciences.  
Let us illustrate with two examples how the efforts on revealing the 
neuroessences of neurohomunculi would help in advancing a physicalist account of 
mental states. First, the result of an experiment aimed at discovering the 
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psychophysical images of the subjective experience of a pain has shown that each 
subject that underwent the mental experience of such pain had a distinct subjective 
conscious experience of the pain. This means that despite the fact that all the subjects 
were exposed to the same mental experience of the pain, the subjective experience of 
the pain each person has is a function of the cerebral cortical activation in the person 
(Coghill et. al., 2003). The following questions: ‘Why (and how) is the functioning of 
the cerebral cortical region associated with a particular kind of pain and not another?’ 
‘Why was the cerebral cortical activation not associated with conscious experience of 
joy?’ ‘What is in cerebral cortical activation that makes it to function as a particular 
mental state of pain not of excitment?’ are important in bridging the gap between the 
mental state of pain and brain state of cerebral cortical activation. To answer, it could 
be argued that the mental state of pain is a function of some neurohomunculus in the 
cerebral cortical region of the brain; and to establish the link is to reveal the 
neuroessence or the internal constitution of the neurohomunculus – cortical region in 
the brain, which makes the neurohomunculus to function as it does. 
Again, the result of an experiment on the neural basis of what it feels like to be 
anxious shows that the mental state of feeling anxious is a function of the disturbances 
in the central cortex (the limbic system) caused by the release and interaction of some 
neurotransmitters and their (and other) receptors such as norepinephrine, GABA and 
serotonin into the central nervous system of an anxious person (Brawman-Mintzer 
and Lydiard, 1997). Hence, given neurofuctionalism and neuroessentialism, the 
mental state of feel of anxiety is explained as a function of some neural interactions, 
and the essence of the neural that make them to interact in the way they actually do.  
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However, the question that threatens the postulations of neurohomunculi and 
neuroessentialism as physicalist theories is, ‘Why are the release and interactions of 
the particular neurotransmitters and receptors accompanied by the feel or the mental 
experience of anxiety, and not of love?’ Obtaining information about the internal 
constitution of each of the neurotransmitters would be the first step to take in the 
attempt to answer the question. Though, neuroscientists are versed in describing the 
activities of neurotransmitters and receptors, little attention, if any, is paid to 
uncovering why, given the real nature of neuroessence of the neurochemicals, they 
function as they are said to be. Neuroscientists agree that there is no exhaustive 
knowledge of what a particular neurotransmitter, such as dopamine, is capable of 
doing if it is released into the synaptic cleft (Wilcox, et.al, 1998, 11-17). This 
confirms that the neuroscientists do not know the true or real nature of dopamine. At 
present, there seems to be no sustained effort towards this goal. It is argued that this 
gap could be filled by advancing the position of neuroessentialism.  
As earlier argued, neuroessences are open to empirical investigation. 
Neuroessences qualify as hidden physical properties, which, according to hidden 
nature physicalism, are identical with experiential properties of mental experiences. 
This is because, as Robinson pointed out, “a hidden nature of blue (or of an 
experience of blue), (it) must be some particular arrangement of physical individuals 
and properties; that is, (it) must be physical individuals having certain physical 
properties and standing in certain physical relations”, a description that fits the nature 
of neuroessences (2016, 73). So, neuroessentialism would be a scientific or an 
empirical investigation into the nature, power and operative mechanisms of 
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neuroessence. The findings of neuroessentialism would provide a basis for assessing, 
first, the results and findings from the neuroscientists’ experiments and research on 
the observed qualities and functions of neurohomunculi – the central nervous system, 
neurochemicals and other entities in the nervous system. Second, neuroessentialism 
would serve as a means of ascertaining the correctness and plausibility, or otherwise, 
of the neurofunctionalists’ claim that qualia are the functions of the neurohomuncunli.  
The above concludes the presentation of the possible physicalist hypotheses. 
What derives from these is the physicalist position that mental states are functions of 
neurohomunculi in a human being. Neurohomunculi perform their functions by virtue 
of their neuroessence. Neuroessence is an object of empirical investigation, it follows 
that mental states are objects of empirical investigation. Neuroessentialism is a 
proposal that opens a new challenge to neuroscientists to seek knowledge of the 
essences of entities, neurochemicals, properties and processes in the nervous system, 
in order to know their real nature and what make them perform the kind of functions 
that researches and experiments have revealed that they perform. This will provide a 
background to the neurofunctionalist hypothesis that mental states are explainable 
within the framework of physicalism, thus bridging the supposed explanatory gap 
between mental and brain states. 
Conclusion 
In this paper, a physicalist hypothesis called neurofunctionalism has been 
developed by combining the plausible theory of homuncular functionalism with 
findings in neuroscience about mental states. What the neurofunctionalist hypothesis 
shows is that mental states are functions of some neurohomunculi in the human body. 
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It submits that the neurofunctionalist hypothesis would not be able to answer 
questions, why and how mental states arise. To address these questions, 
neuroessentialism was proposed as a hypothesis that would explain the neuroessences 
of neurohomunculi. Since mental states are functions of the neurohomunculi, and 
these functions are causally produced by the neuroessence of the neurohomunculi, it 
could be explained why mental states are explainable through neuroessence. So, the 
findings of neuroessentialism will provide a basis for an understanding of why and 
how a neurohomunculus functions as a particular mental state, and not another. As a 
real entity in the world, neuroessence is open to empirical investigation. 
Neuroessentialism is suggested as a new phase of neuroscientific research that can 
help advance the physicalist solution to the supposed explanatory gap of how to 
explain a mental state in terms of the essential features of the central nervous system.  
References 
Ataria, Yochai. 2017. “The Answers to the Ultimate Question of Life, the Universe, 
and Everything: Or Some Reflections on the Feasibility of the Neurophenomenology 
Research Program”. Journal of Consciousness Studies.   Vol. 24, Nos. 1 & 2: 7-30. 
 
Badcock, Johanna C. 2016. “A Neuropsychological Approach to Auditory Verbal 
Hallucinations and Thought Insertion – Grounded in Normal Voice Perception”. 
Review of Philosophy and Psychology. Vol. 7: 631-652. doi.10.1007/s13164-015-
0270-3, accessed online 5th April, 2016 from 
link.springer.com/content/pdf/10.1007%2Fs13164-015-0270-3.pdf. 
 
Brawman-Mintzer, O. and Lydiard, R. B. 1997. ‘Biological Basis of Generalized 
Anxiety Disorder’, Journal of Clinical Psychiatry, Vol. 58, Suppl.3: 16-25 
 
Coghill, Robert C.  McHaffie, John G., and Ye-Fen, Yen. 2003. “Neural Correlates of 
Interindividual Differences in the Subjective Experience of Pain”. Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences (PNAS). Vol. 100, No. 14: 8538-8542. 
 
Dennett, Daniel C. 1975. ‘Why the Law of Effect Will Not Go Away’. Journal of the 
Theory of Social Behaviour. Vol. 5, Issue 2: 169-188. 
  
 Caribbean Journal of Philosophy 
 





Dennett, Daniel C. 1981. Brainstorm: Philosophical Essays on Mind and Psychology. 
Sussex: The Harvester Press Limited. 
 
Fodor, Jerry. 1971. ‘Materialism’. In Materialism and the Mind-Body Problem. 
Edited by Rosenthal, David M. London: Prentice-Hall International Inc., pp. 128-149.  
Francescotti, Robert. 2014. Physicalism and the Mind. New York: Springer.  
Howell, Robert J. and Thompson, Brad. 2016. “Phenomenally Mine: In Search of the 
Subjective Character of Consciousness”. Review of Philosophy and Psychology. Vol. 




Kammerer, F. 2019. “Does the Explanatory Gap Rest on a Fallacy?” Review of 
Philosophy and Psychology. Vol. 10. 649–667. doi.org/10.1007/s13164-018-0424-1j. 
 
Levin, Joseph. 2002. “Materialism and Qualia: The Explanatory Gap”. In Mind: 
Classical and Contemporary Readings. Edited by Chalmers David. New York: 
Oxford University Press, 354-361. 
 
Locke, John. 1977.  An Essay Concerning Human Understanding. London: Fontana 
Library. 
 
Lycan, William G. 1990. Mind and Cognition: A Reader. Cambridge: Basil 
Blackwell, Inc. 
 
Nagel, Thomas. 1997. “What it is like to be a Bat”. In The Nature of Consciousness: 
Philosophical Debates. Edited by Block Ned, Flanagan Owen and Güzeldere Güven 
Cambridge: MIT Press. 
 
Papineau, David. 2002. Thinking about Consciousness. Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
 
Putnam, Hilary. 1960. “Minds and Machines.” In Dimensions of Mind. Edited by 
Sydney Hook. New York: New York University Press. 
 
Reiner, Peter Bart. 2011. “The Rise of Neuroessentialism”. In the Oxford Handbook 
of Neuroethics. Edited by Illes, J Illes and Sahakian B. Sahakian. 1-16. Accessed on 
June 12, 2020 from https://ssrn.com/abstract=3128444.  
 
Robinson, William S. 2016. “Hidden Nature Physicalism”. Review of Philosophy and 
Psychology, vol. 7: 71-89. 
 
 Caribbean Journal of Philosophy 
 





Roskies, A. L. 2007. “Neuroethics Beyond Genethics: Despite the Overlap between 
the Ethics of Neuroscience and Genetics, there are Important Areas where the Two 
Diverge”. EMBO Report. Vol. 8: 52-56. 
 
Ryle, Gilbert. 1949. The Concept of Mind. London: Hutchinson.  
Searle, John. 2004. Mind: A Brief Introduction. Oxford: Oxford University Press. 
 
Stoljar, Daniel. 2010. Physicalism. New York: Routledge. 
Taylor, Elanor. 2016. “Explanation and the Explanatory Gap”. Acta Analytica. Vol. 
31: 77-78. 
 
Wilcox, Richard E., Gonzales, Rueben A., and Miller, Joseph D. 1998. ‘Introduction 
to Neurotransmitters, Receptors, Signal Transduction, and Second Messengers’, in 
Textbook of Psychopharmacology. Edited by Schatzberg, Alan F. and Nemeroff, 
Charles. Washington DC: American Psychiatric Press, Inc. 3-36. 
 
 
 
